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Neglected Infectious Diseases: Are Push and Pull Incentive 
Mechanisms Suitable for Promoting Research? 
 
Frank Müller-Langer* 
Abstract 
Infectious diseases are among the main causes of death and disability in developing 
countries, and they are a major reason for the health disparity between rich and poor 
countries. One of the reasons for this public health tragedy is a lack of lifesaving 
essential medicines, which either do not exist or badly need improvements. In this 
article, we analyse which of the push and pull mechanisms proposed in the recent 
literature may serve to promote research into neglected infectious diseases. A 
combination of push programs that subsidise research inputs through direct funding 
and pull programs that reward research output rather than research input may be the 
appropriate strategy to stimulate research into neglected diseases. On the one hand, 
early-stage (basic) research should be supported through push mechanisms, such as 
research grants or publicly financed research institutions. On the other hand, pull 
mechanisms, such as prize funds that link reward payments to the health impacts of 
effective medicines, have the potential to stimulate research into neglected diseases. 
 
I. Introduction 
Infectious diseases are a major reason for the health disparity between rich and poor 
countries (Stiglitz and Jayadev, 2010). They kill 14 million people worldwide every 
year, predominantly affecting members of poor populations in developing countries 
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(WHO, 2001). In fact, these countries make up 98 per cent of the global disease 
burden for infectious diseases, such as malaria, trachoma, lymphatic filariasis or 
schistosomiasis (WHO, 2008). One of the reasons for this public health tragedy is a 
lack of lifesaving essential medicines, which either do not exist or badly need 
improvement (Kremer and Williams, 2010; Mrazek and Mossialos, 2003). The 
pharmaceutical industry has little incentive to invest in research and development 
(R&D) for infectious diseases that predominantly plague poor nations, as medicines 
cannot be sold at a price that allows pharmaceutical firms to cover their high R&D 
costs (Buckup, 2008). There is a significant positive relationship between a 
pharmaceutical firm’s expected returns and its R&D expenditures (Grabowski and 
Vernon, 2000). Furthermore, Acemoglu and Linn (2004) suggest that pharmaceutical 
R&D is directed towards more profitable markets. In fact, the pharmaceutical 
markets in the poorest countries are too small to trigger significant R&D for 
medicines for neglected infectious diseases that are prevalent in these countries 
(Maurer, 2005). Although a large number of consumers in the developing world lack 
effective medicines for such diseases, their purchasing power is too low to generate a 
sufficiently large market (Kremer, 2002). In these circumstances pharmaceutical 
companies decide that the return on R&D investment for neglected infectious 
diseases will be less than the return on an equivalent investment for medicines for the 
developed world (Webber and Kremer, 2001).1 Although the infectious diseases that 
are the most prevalent in poor nations account for 11.4 per cent of the global disease 
burden, only 1 per cent of all pharmaceutical products marketed in the period from 
1975 to 1999 were targeted at them (Trouiller et al., 2002). The introduction of 
patent protection in the developing world is not a sufficient solution to the problem 
                                              
1 One may argue that local R&D for medicines for neglected diseases prevalent in countries with 
emerging pharmaceutical industries, such as India or Brazil, may help to eradicate those diseases. 
However, Kettler and Modi (2001) find that Indian pharmaceutical companies are more likely to 
target diseases that are prevalent in industrialized countries, such as diabetes or cancer. 
 3 
of underinvestment in R&D for neglected diseases (Kremer, 2002). Even if patent 
protection provided an adequate incentive mechanism to successfully stimulate 
R&D, patented medicines may still not be affordable for large groups of consumers 
in poor countries (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). In this article, we analyse which 
incentive mechanisms mitigate the problem of underinvestment in R&D for 
medicines for neglected diseases. 
The following section analyses push programs that subsidise research inputs 
through direct funding. The third section studies pull programs, such as prize funds 
and advanced purchase commitments. In the fourth section, we conclude and provide 
policy recommendations. 
 
II. Are Push Programs Suitable for Promoting Research into 
Neglected Diseases? 
Programs that subsidise research inputs through direct funding, such as research 
grants to universities and government laboratories or tax credits for R&D investment, 
are called push programs. Current push programs aimed at promoting R&D into 
malaria research are the Medicines for Malaria Venture and the Malaria Vaccine 
Initiative. 
A. Publicly Funded Research Institutions 
Large publicly funded research institutions, such as universities or the US 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), play a significant role in promoting basic 
research (Glennerster and Kremer, 2001). They help to create non-patentable 
fundamental scientific knowledge, which provides a base for the downstream 
discoveries of the profit-seeking pharmaceutical industry (Maurer, 2005). This 
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publicly available fundamental scientific knowledge generated by publicly funded 
research institutions reduces the research costs incurred by the pharmaceutical 
industry. It thereby potentially increases private incentives to invest in applied 
research (Webber and Kremer, 2001). However, negative experiences with publicly 
funded programs in financing the commercial R&D of marketable pharmaceutical 
products suggest that push programs are subject to difficulties resulting from 
information asymmetries between researchers and government research 
administrators (Kremer, 1998). Moral hazard problems may arise because 
government research administrators cannot perfectly monitor research activities 
(Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). Researchers, once they are funded, may have 
incentives to redirect their resources to non-core research activities, putting their 
efforts towards unrelated and more rewarding research projects or towards preparing 
the next grant application (Webber and Kremer, 2001). The effective management of 
the performance of researchers, together with reputation effects and the contingency 
of future funding on previous performance, may help to mitigate moral hazard 
problems (Gallini and Scotchmer, 2002). 
Adverse selection problems may occur in publicly funded push programs. 
Difficulties in determining the quality of research are likely to arise because these 
programs pay for research inputs on the basis of an ex ante evaluation of potential 
product delivery, not on the basis of successful product development (Maurer, 2005). 
Researchers have better information about the probability of success of a research 
program than do government research administrators (Kremer and Glennerster, 
2004). They may, therefore, have incentives to act opportunistically by 
overestimating the probability of success of the research program in order to acquire 
the funding in the first place or to increase the amount awarded (Hollis, 2007). 
However, due to the lack of appropriate information, government research 
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administrators may be unable to determine which research projects should be funded 
or which diseases should be targeted (Kremer, 2002). Hence, asymmetric 
information with respect to the probability of success of research projects may result 
in the funding of projects that only have a small probability of success (Kremer and 
Glennerster, 2004). Even worse, government research administrators may decide not 
to fund a worthwhile research project with a high probability of success because they 
doubt that the project’s probability of success is credible (Kremer, 2002). These 
problems can be diminished if a private pharmaceutical firm or research institution is 
only paid by a government agency after it has successfully developed a specific 
marketable pharmaceutical product. In this case, researchers will have strong 
incentives to evaluate the likelihood of success of their research projects more 
realistically and to focus on the development of the desired product (Kremer and 
Glennerster, 2004). 
B. Targeted R&D Tax Credits 
In contrast to publicly funded research institutions, targeted R&D tax credits are a 
direct contribution to pharmaceutical companies, designed to promote R&D into 
specific neglected diseases (Hall and van Reenen, 2000). R&D tax credits finance 
research inputs rather than research outputs (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). In the 
USA, for instance, pharmaceutical companies are eligible for a 20 per cent R&D tax 
credit. Nevertheless, a bill introduced in the US Congress that proposed to increase 
the R&D tax credit for R&D into vaccines for HIV, tuberculosis and malaria to 30 
per cent was never passed into law.2 The private returns to R&D for neglected 
diseases are much lower than the social returns to R&D for these diseases (Lybecker 
and Freeman, 2007). This results in private firms investing less than is socially 
                                              
2 Vaccines for the New Millennium Act (US). H. R. 1504. 107th Congress, 1st Session, 4 April 2001. 
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optimal. R&D tax credits address this problem. However, as targeted R&D tax 
credits subsidise research inputs for a specific pharmaceutical product rather than 
rewarding successful product development, they are subject to monitoring problems 
similar to those for other push mechanisms (Kremer, 2001). Pharmaceutical 
companies may have incentives to use their superior knowledge relative to 
government agencies to maximise their claims through creative accounting (Kremer 
and Glennerster, 2004). 
As for R&D for medicines for neglected diseases, eg., a malaria vaccine suitable 
for consumers in poor regions, R&D tax credits may present a number of issues 
(Mrazek and Mossialos, 2003). A targeted R&D tax credit could be claimed by a 
pharmaceutical company pursuing R&D for versions of the pharmaceutical product 
that are not appropriate for poor countries (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). Suppose 
that a pharmaceutical company claims a targeted tax credit for R&D into a malaria 
vaccine. The health needs of residents in low-income countries with respect to a 
malaria vaccine significantly differ from the health needs of residents in high-income 
countries: A malaria vaccine appropriate for travellers or military personnel, who 
only spend a limited period of time in an endemic region, may have different 
characteristics than a malaria vaccine appropriate for residents, who live in those 
regions permanently (Kremer, 2002). Additionally, Kremer and Glennerster (2004) 
suggest that a malaria vaccine for consumers in high-income countries is more likely 
to focus on the early life-cycle sporozoite-stage of the malaria parasite when it is 
transmitted from an Anopheles mosquito to its human host. A malaria vaccine that 
focuses on the sporozoite-stage of malaria may only provide temporary protection 
and thus be inadequate for consumers in low-income countries (Kremer, 2002). 
 7 
There is one final drawback associated with targeted R&D tax credits. They 
cannot mitigate the fact that residents in poor regions do not have access to 
affordable medicines (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). 
C. Conclusion to Push Programs 
Given the dearth of R&D for medicines for neglected infectious diseases, direct 
public funding of basic research into these diseases could be an appropriate option to 
provide a base for downstream discoveries in the pharmaceutical sector. Moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems suggest that push programs may not be the 
optimal solution to finance the development of marketable pharmaceutical products. 
Push programs are, however, suitable to promote basic research and provide a basis 
for subsequent applied and commercially exploitable research. Additional 
mechanisms are necessary to encourage private pharmaceutical companies to 
develop medicines for neglected infectious diseases and to improve affordable access 
to those medicines for residents of low-income countries. 
 
III. Are Pull Programs Suitable for Promoting Research into 
Neglected Diseases? 
In contrast to push programs, pull programs such as prizes, advanced purchase 
commitments and patent buyouts reward research output rather than research input. 
A pull program rewards the actual creation of a desired medicine or vaccine but not 
the R&D input itself. 
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A. Prizes 
A targeted prize is a payment that is made to a researcher conditional on the 
achievement of a particular outcome, ie., a technical specification of a desired drug 
or vaccine (Maurer, 2005). Non-profit organisations have recently identified prize 
challenges as tools to create incentives that foster R&D in the pharmaceutical field. 
For instance, Prize4Life set up two challenges to promote R&D on Amyotrophic 
Lateral Sclerosis (ALS, also known as Lou Gehrig’s disease). With respect to 
neglected infectious diseases, the X Prize Foundation and the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation are currently developing an X Prize Challenge for the effective diagnosis 
of tuberculosis in the developing world, where the world’s second most lethal 
infectious disease is most prevalent. 
Love and Hubbard (2007) promote a radical rethinking in the field of 
pharmaceutical innovation policy, suggesting a mandatory prize mechanism as an 
alternative to the marketing monopolies constituted by patents. The basic idea of the 
‘Medical Innovation Prize Fund’ is to ‘divorce the incentive for innovation from the 
product’s price to consumers’ so that ‘knowledge goods, including the R&D for a 
new medicine, can be placed in the public domain immediately’ (Love and Hubbard, 
2007, p. 1528). The reward shall only be given if an innovation has made a 
significant impact on public health. This would lead to ‘open’ innovations, yet still 
reward innovators financially (provided patients benefit from the new drug). An 
example of such a mechanism is the prize fund introduced by former US 
Representative B. Sanders, called the Medical Innovation Prize Act, based on 
proposals by Love and Hubbard.3 The total size of the proposed fund was to be 0.5 
per cent of the US gross domestic product. The prize fund would have been 
                                              
3 Medical Innovation Prize Act (US). H.R. 417. 109th Congress, 1st Session, 26 January 2005. An 
identical bill was reintroduced in 2007. Note that it never became law. 
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structured to target diseases that predominantly affect poor nations, with a minimum 
initial allocation of 4 per cent for globally neglected diseases. 
Hollis and Pogge (2008) promote a voluntary prize fund named the ‘Health 
Impact Fund’ (HIF), which is designed as a supplement to the existing system of 
patent protection. In this optional pay-for-performance scheme for new medicines, 
pharmaceutical companies would be free to abandon monopoly pricing (but not their 
exclusivity right deriving from a patent) and instead participate by registering 
products with the HIF, which would reward them in proportion to the measurable net 
health impacts of their products. Rewards would be conditional on the products being 
priced (roughly) no higher than the average cost of production (Pogge, 2010). The 
scope of the HIF would be global. Participating states would act as funding partners. 
As for the nature of the payment, there are two design options. The first option is a 
fixed pool to be split among the innovators according to the product’s health impact; 
the pool might be guaranteed for, say, fifteen years. This would make the cost of the 
HIF politically attractive and predictable for member states, but it would also place a 
burden on innovators resulting from uncertainty as to the exact rate of reward per 
Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY).4 An alternative would be to offer innovators a 
fixed amount of money per QALY. This would remove uncertainty for innovators 
but impose uncertainty on member states regarding the annual cost of the HIF 
(Pogge, 2010). Unlike the mandatory prize fund proposed by Love and Hubbard, the 
voluntary HIF would be targeted at medicines for neglected infectious diseases in 
particular, while innovations with very high market value would still be distributed 
under the patent system (Hollis and Pogge, 2008). 
                                              
4 In this standardized measure of health benefit, a year in perfect health has the value of one, while a 
year in poorer health has a value between zero and one. 
 10 
1. Advantages of Prizes 
First, suppose that the creation of a new drug or vaccine is successfully stimulated 
through a prize and donated to the public or made available to the public at the cost 
of production. In this case, the drug or vaccine is not subject to the inefficient 
(monopoly) pricing associated with the market exclusivity provided by a patent. 
Second, in contrast to push programs, prizes are not likely to be subject to moral 
hazard problems. Because a researcher will only receive the prize once the desired 
drug or vaccine is successfully developed, incentives to stray from the task or shift 
research priorities to other projects are lower under a prize mechanism (Maurer, 
2005). Third, the technical specification of a prize could be designed to spur the 
development of a drug or vaccine appropriate for use in low-income countries 
(Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). For instance, the prize for the development of a 
malaria vaccine may only be awarded if it fulfils specific requirements, eg., that the 
vaccine should prevent not less than 50 per cent of plasmodium falciparum malaria, 
which is the most dangerous type of malaria with the highest mortality rate (Maurer, 
2005; WHO, 2005). Fourth, in contrast to patents, an innovator awarded a prize for 
successfully developing a specific drug does not have to fear profit-reducing 
infringement. He does not incur the high costs of litigation and identifying alleged 
patent infringers (Gallini and Scotchmer, 2002). As for prize funds such as the HIF 
or the Medical Innovation Prize Fund, there are further advantages. Because rewards 
would be linked to actual results in terms of incremental healthcare benefits, the 
pharmaceutical industry would not be inclined to manufacture inferior or 
unnecessary products but would be incentivised to make a measurable impact on 
global health. Consequently, competition for product quality and effectiveness would 
be created (Love and Hubbard, 2007). However, prices would remain low because 
pharmaceutical companies would have a great interest in making their product 
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available to the greatest number of people in order to achieve the greatest possible 
health impact (Pogge, 2010). Additionally, companies registered with a particular 
fund would be incentivised to do more than just sell the product. To make an optimal 
impact on public health, patients would need to be fully instructed on dosage and 
compliance. Because of the lack of a public health infrastructure in poor countries, 
patients often receive unsuitable products or suitable products that are not used in the 
right way (Mrazek and Mossialos, 2003). This ‘last-mile problem’ would be 
mitigated in a prize system in which companies would have an incentive to ensure 
that products are used properly by cooperating with governments and NGOs (Pogge, 
2010). 
2. Disadvantages of Prizes 
First, if the sponsor of a prize does not have accurate information about the 
prospective benefits and costs of the innovation to be rewarded, the reward is likely 
to differ from the social value of the innovation, resulting in either underpayment or 
overpayment (Maurer, 2005). The core difficulty with respect to prizes is 
determining how large the prize should be. For instance, the prize fund mechanisms 
introduced above only reward manufacturers of products that have made a positive 
impact on public health. Calculating the incremental health impact of medicines, 
which is essential for the effective operation of the HIF, appears to be an extremely 
challenging task that could very well overburden agencies. Clinical trials do not give 
conclusive and accurate assessments of a drug’s impact and are usually complicated 
by factors such as varying effects across different populations or the lack of suitable 
biomarkers (Liddell, 2010). Although these efforts could be supplemented by field 
trials, the huge expenditures of time and money demanded by such undertakings 
could easily prevent agencies from carrying them out in the first place (Liddell, 
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2010). Because the assessment of health impacts would rely in part on the number of 
units sold, fraud, aggressive marketing and advertising could become common 
practices among companies to exaggerate the benefits of their products (Liddell, 
2010). As incremental health benefits are difficult to calculate, even ex post, decision 
makers could act at their own discretion. For instance, a new drug typically 
substitutes or complements an existing product. The new drug may also be (more) 
beneficial to certain patients and not beneficial to others (Kremer and Williams, 
2010). Depending on the room for discretion left to a committee in charge of ex post 
assessment, prize funds may create the potential for static costs associated with rent-
seeking and dynamic losses from inappropriate incentives (Kremer and Williams, 
2010). A further problem with the assessment of new products arises if one considers 
complementary inventions. The exact distribution of the awards may be difficult 
because producers would have incentives to overstate the importance and the R&D 
costs of their respective inventions and thus mislead decision makers about the size 
of their share (Kremer and Williams, 2010). Additionally, sponsors have incentives 
to renege on their promise once the invention is finished, eg., by creating reasons that 
the invention is useless and not eligible for the prize (Maurer, 2005). It is, therefore, 
of critical importance that the rules of a prize, eg., the process for assessing the value 
of an innovation, are clearly specified in advance and enforceable by a court (Kremer 
and Glennerster, 2004). The sponsor must adopt a credible commitment strategy ex 
ante to reduce his ability to renege ex post to prevent the erosion of the incentives to 
innovate. This time-inconsistency problem may also be solved through a bonding 
mechanism, ie., a conflict resolution mechanism. 
Second, Maurer (2005) suggests that publicly funded prizes are likely to be 
less favourable politically than patents because large lump-sum (governmental) prize 
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payments are more visible to voters than patent revenues spread out over a large 
number of doses. 
Third, prizes may result in a wasteful prize race in which R&D investments 
are duplicated (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). If prizes offer the full social value of 
an innovation, competing firms may allocate excessive resources to their research. 
Another disadvantage of prizes compared to patents stems from the fact that public 
or private sponsors are required to finance the prize (Maurer, 2005). If a prize is 
publicly financed, it may eliminate the deadweight loss associated with patents. 
However, public financing (ie., through taxation of other goods) creates its own 
welfare reducing distortions. Furthermore, if one considers a mandatory prize fund 
for the entire pharmaceutical market, it may be hazardous to make pharmaceutical 
R&D depend on the willingness of states to pay into the system, as unforeseen 
circumstances may cause them to commit to lower amounts of funding or prevent 
them from participating in the first place (Hollis and Pogge, 2008). Conversely, there 
is a certain danger that companies will simply ignore any voluntary mechanism if it 
generates lower profits than monopoly pricing. If, however, rewards from funds such 
as the HIF were great enough to increase existing profit margins in the 
pharmaceutical sector at the expense of the public purse, this aspect of public 
funding would arguably not be appealing to taxpayers (Liddell, 2010). 
B. Patent Buyouts 
Kremer (1998) examines the potential of patent buyouts to promote innovations and 
analyses the use of auctions to determine patent buyout prices. He suggests that the 
patent authority should offer to buy relevant patents at a price that is equal to its 
estimated private value plus a mark-up reflecting the ratio of the social to the private 
value of the invention. Under the assumption that the value of an invention is 
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observable to competitors of the patent-holding firm, the market value of the patent 
would be estimated through a sealed-bid second-price auction. The patent authority 
should place most of the patents it buys in the public domain so that the innovation 
can be produced and marketed at a competitive price. However, only a small fraction 
of the patents purchased would be sold to the firm with the highest bid to provide the 
auction participants with incentives to disclose their true expectations of the market 
value of the patent (Harhoff et al., 2003; Kremer, 1998). The patent authority would 
randomly choose which patent will eventually be sold to the high bidder and thus not 
be placed in the public domain. 
1. Advantages of Patent Buyouts 
First, because the price the original developer of a patented innovation can realise 
from selling the patent to the patent authority typically exceeds the private value of 
the patent, patent buyouts are likely to increase private R&D incentives (Kremer, 
1998). Thus, they may help to moderate the market failure that private returns on 
R&D are typically lower than social returns on R&D (Kremer and Glennerster, 
2004). Second, as most of the patents purchased will enter the public domain so that 
the innovation can be produced and marketed at a competitive price, the deadweight 
losses due to inefficient monopoly pricing associated with patents will be eliminated. 
Kremer (1998) points out that the pharmaceutical sector would be a natural area to 
try the buyout scheme. When purchased patents are put in the public domain, 
pharmaceutical markets are likely to be relatively competitive, as compared to a 
patent-induced monopoly situation with large monopoly mark-ups. Moreover, 
considerable information about medical products is gathered during the patent 
approval procedure of a new medicine, eg., through the European Medicines Agency 
(EMA) in the EU or the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the US. Auction 
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participants could therefore use this information to make informed bids (Kremer, 
1998). Finally, monopoly profits would be eliminated in those cases in which the 
patent purchased is put in the public domain. Patent buyouts thus potentially mitigate 
the problem that the original innovator’s competitors are typically inclined to invest 
in wasteful duplicative research for substitute products in order to capture profits 
from the innovator (Kremer, 1998). 
2. Disadvantages of Patent Buyouts 
The second-price auction, which is of crucial importance to the effective operation of 
patent buyouts, is potentially vulnerable to collusive behaviour between the patent 
holder and auction participants (Kremer, 1998). Patent holders have incentives to pay 
auction participants to make a bid that is higher than their true valuation of the patent 
to increase buyout prices (Kremer, 2001). Most of the purchased patents are placed 
in the public domain, whereas only a small fraction of them would actually be sold to 
the highest bidders. Hence, on the one hand, the bribed bidders would face a low 
probability of having to pay the patent authority. On the other hand, the patent 
holders would be confident in getting an inflated price. However, Kremer (1998) 
points out several mechanisms for preventing collusive behaviour, eg., sealed bids, 
punishing colluding firms, or rewards for whistleblowers, among others. 
Second, patent buyouts could aggravate the problem of patent races and 
wasteful duplication of R&D expenses, as the price the patent authority would pay 
for a patent is typically higher than its private (commercial) value (Gallini and 
Scotchmer, 2002). Additionally, patent buyouts are a visible lump-sum payment and 
thus are likely to be less politically attractive than the less visible patent revenues 
spread out over a large number of doses (Maurer, 2005). 
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C. Orphan Drugs 
Huntington’s disease, ALS and Tourette syndrome are referred to as rare diseases or 
conditions, as only a very small number of people suffer from them. Under normal 
market conditions, the prospective market for medicines for these rare diseases is too 
small to stimulate research by the private pharmaceutical sector (Villa et al., 2009). 
Drugs to cure these rare diseases are commonly referred to as ‘orphan drugs’. Unlike 
neglected infectious diseases, these diseases are not necessarily diseases of poverty; 
however, they share the same core problem. Under normal market conditions, the 
pharmaceutical sector would be reluctant to develop new medicines to treat and cure 
these diseases. The main difference is that additional incentive programs to stimulate 
research into rare diseases have already been successfully established in 
industrialised countries.5 The US Orphan Drug Act provides R&D incentives in the 
form of regulatory assistance, eg., fast-track regulatory approval, research grants and 
tax credits for clinical testing and R&D expenses incurred in connection with 
research into diseases that affect less than 200,000 persons in the US (Kremer and 
Glennerster, 2004). 
From the pharmaceutical industry’s perspective, the most important feature of 
the Orphan Drug Act is arguably the promise of seven years of market exclusivity 
from the date of approval.6 Market exclusivity is achieved by prohibiting a regulatory 
agency from granting marketing authorisation to any similar medicine in the same 
therapeutic area (Villa et al., 2009). Market exclusivity is, in addition, granted 
independent from the existence of patent protection. In the pharmaceutical sector, 
developers of the initial product often face a risk that ‘me-too’ drugs may capture 
                                              
5 The US Orphan Drug Act became effective in 1983. Japan and Australia established orphan drug 
systems based on the US model in 1993 and 1998, respectively. The European Regulation on Orphan 
Medicinal Products was approved by the European Parliament in 1999. 
6 Section 527 of the Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. 360cc(a). See also Kremer and Glennerster (2004). 
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much of the initial product’s market. This risk can even discourage R&D into the 
initial product in the first place, although patent protection would be available. The 
Orphan Drug Act’s provision guaranteeing market exclusivity to the initial product 
aims to discourage the development of ‘me-too’ drugs in particular (Kremer and 
Glennerster, 2004). It is widely seen as a crucially important element of the act to 
stimulate research into orphan drugs (Shulman and Manocchia, 1997). 
Empirical evidence suggests that the combination of push mechanisms, such 
as grants or tax benefits, and pull mechanisms, such as the promise of market 
exclusivity as provided by the Orphan Drug Act, successfully stimulates the 
development of medicines for rare diseases (Lichtenberg and Waldfogel, 2003). As 
of 4 October 2007, the total number of orphan drugs approved since 1983 is 315 
(Ricklin and Lambris, 2007). In contrast, fewer than 10 such medicinal products for 
rare diseases were marketed in the decade prior to the Orphan Drug Act (Berndt et 
al., 2007). As to the underinvestment in R&D for neglected infectious diseases, the 
Orphan Drug Act may serve as a successful and tested model of a combination of 
push incentives, such as tax credits and grants, and pull incentives, such as the 
promise of market exclusivity over a certain period (Lichtenberg and Waldfogel, 
2003). 
D. Advanced Purchase Commitments 
Advanced purchase commitments (APCs) are ex ante commitments by national 
governments, international organisations or private foundations to purchase a certain 
quantity of a drug or vaccine that has yet to be invented at a certain price (Kremer 
and Glennerster, 2000). A government, for instance, could sign a contract to buy a 
prospective malaria vaccine suitable for use in low-income countries from a 
pharmaceutical company. The vaccine would be required to meet certain technical 
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criteria such as safety, efficacy and usability and pass a market-test regarding its 
suitability for use in low-income recipient countries (Kremer, 2001; Kremer and 
Glennerster, 2000). If the vaccine is successfully invented, the government would 
then make the vaccine available to countries in need at a price that is lower than the 
monopoly price (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). The main purpose of an APC is to 
create a sufficiently large expected market for medicines for neglected infectious 
diseases so that pharmaceutical companies find an investment in R&D worthwhile. 
Berndt et al. (2007) have investigated how large a purchase commitment would need 
to be to give developers incentives comparable to product markets for diseases 
prevalent in rich countries. Their results suggest that a $3.1 billion commitment in 
the net present value of sales would be comparable to the value of the sales earned by 
an average of a sample of recently launched commercial products. 
1. Advantages of Advanced Purchase Commitments 
First, the most attractive features of a suitably designed APC are arguably that it 
reduces market uncertainty and increases the expected market for a desired drug or 
vaccine, as it specifies a guaranteed price and the quantity to be purchased in 
advance (Webber and Kremer, 2001). 
Second, in contrast to push mechanisms, APCs reward successful research 
output rather than research input (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). They are 
consequently less vulnerable to moral hazard problems than push programs. The 
developer of a malaria vaccine will only sell a certain quantity of a vaccine at a 
certain price if the vaccine is successfully developed, fulfils all technical criteria, and 
passes the market-test for suitability in low-income countries. His incentives to stray 
from the task are thus lower under an APC than under a push mechanism 
(Glennerster and Kremer, 2001). 
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Third, Kremer and Glennerster (2004) suppose that the sponsor is less than 
totally confident about the scientific prospects for the successful development of a 
malaria vaccine due to huge scientific challenges. On the one hand, a sponsor may 
not be inclined to provide direct push support to finance research into a malaria 
vaccine because he may not be willing to bear the risk of financing a project that 
eventually fails. On the other hand, he might be more willing to make an APC, even 
when scientific prospects for success are not entirely clear (Kremer and Glennerster, 
2004). 
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical companies supposedly have better information 
than sponsors or buyers about the feasibility of scientific research. Hence, under an 
APC, those pharmaceutical companies that find that the development of a malaria 
vaccine is scientifically feasible and commercially attractive will pursue research 
into the vaccine (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). By creating incentives for 
pharmaceutical companies to follow those research strategies that they think will 
result in marketable pharmaceutical products, APCs imitate the R&D incentives a 
market typically provides (Webber and Kremer, 2001). 
Fourth, suppose that the buyer of a vaccine or drug promoted through an APC 
makes the medicines available to consumers in least developed countries either for 
free or at a relatively low price. In this case, APCs would help to mitigate both of the 
central problems related to neglected infectious diseases: the underinvestment of 
R&D into those diseases and the lack of access to affordable drugs and vaccines in 
least developed countries (Kremer, 2002). 
Fifth, an analysis of the costs and effectiveness of APCs conducted by Berndt 
et al. (2007) revealed that APCs can have a substantial stimulating effect on the 
R&D for a specific vaccine and still be cost-effective. 
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2. Disadvantages of Advanced Purchase Commitments 
APCs are, like prizes, subject to a time-inconsistency problem (Kremer and 
Glennerster, 2004). Prior to the development of a desired drug or vaccine, buyers, 
such as governments or private foundations, have incentives to promise a guaranteed 
price that allows the innovating firm to cover its R&D costs at a given specified 
quantity. Innovators, however, remain in a position of considerable economic 
dependence because they have made large investments relying upon the purchase 
commitment of (typically) a single party on the demand side. In this situation, buyers 
can make use of a vast bargaining power. They have incentives to renege on their 
promise ex post when the R&D investment is sunk, to obtain the drug or vaccine at 
the lowest possible price (Webber and Kremer, 2001). Potential innovators will 
anticipate this situation and be reluctant to invest in risky and expensive R&D in the 
first place, or they may charge a premium before they take part in this type of a pull 
program (Maurer, 2005). Consequently, to prevent a hold-up situation, an explicit 
long-term commitment with clear, judicially enforceable rules is of crucial 
importance. One way to address this is the establishment of an adjudication 
committee independent from the sponsor or buyer (Kremer, 2002). The main purpose 
of this committee would be to evaluate whether a vaccine or drug promoted through 
a purchase commitment satisfies the eligibility requirements (Kremer and 
Glennerster, 2004). 
Another disadvantage of APCs stems from the fact that sponsors must specify 
the desired innovation to be promoted through the purchase commitment beforehand 
(Villa et al., 2009). APCs may therefore be an inappropriate mechanism to promote 
basic research, as it is typically difficult to specify the output of basic research and 
appropriate eligibility requirements in advance (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). In 
contrast to basic research, it is easier to specify what is meant by an efficacious and 
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safe drug or vaccine. Institutions, such as the EMA or the FDA, are already 
specialised in making such specifications (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). In 
addition, similar to the problem of setting an adequate reward for prizes, it may be 
difficult to set an adequate guaranteed purchasing price in advance to spur research 
because expected R&D expenses are variable and difficult to estimate (DiMasi et al., 
2003). Thus, Maurer (2005) suggests that APCs could result in either underpayment 
or overpayment. On the one hand, given a certain quantity, if the buyer sets the 
guaranteed price too low, the APC fails to stimulate R&D. On the other hand, if the 
buyer sets the price for a certain quantity too high, the additional benefit may cause a 
suboptimally high level of research efforts by competing firms. 
Finally, like patent buyouts and prizes, APCs might be less politically 
attractive than patents because revenues spread out over a large number of doses are 
less noticed by voters than (government) payments (Maurer, 2005). 
E. Conclusion to Pull Programs 
The core benefit of pull programs is that the sponsors of the program only have to 
pay when an innovation is successfully developed (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). 
By linking payments to successful development, pull programs decrease shirking of 
researchers and increase their incentives to concentrate their research efforts on 
marketable innovations (Kremer, 2002). The US Orphan Drug Act provides a tested 
benchmark of how research into diseases with a small expected market can be 
stimulated successfully through a combination of push and pull mechanisms. As for 
neglected infectious diseases, pull programs such as the advanced vaccine purchase 
commitment brought forward by Kremer and Glennerster (2000) have the potential 
to increase the incentives for pharmaceutical companies to develop medicines for 
neglected diseases through a market-oriented and transparent approach. The main 
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difficulty with targeted prizes is the advanced specification of the desired innovation 
(Glennerster and Kremer, 2001). However, prizes are less vulnerable to moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems than push mechanisms and therefore appear to be an 
appropriate incentive mechanism to promote basic research where monitoring is 
typically difficult. Prize fund mechanisms such as the HIF appear to be adequate to 
promote research into neglected infectious diseases, as they link reward payments to 
both the successful development of effective medicines and the incremental health 
impact of registered medicines (Hollis and Pogge, 2008). Registered pharmaceutical 
companies would have significant interest in selling effective medicines at low prices 
and mitigating the ‘last mile problem’. 
Nonetheless, patent buyouts also work in cases where the desired innovation 
cannot be specified in advance (Kremer, 1998). APCs and patent buyouts are market-
based and link payments to the successful development of a desired product. A 
crucially important feature of both is the potential for the establishment of access to 
affordable medicines in low-income countries (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). In a 
patent buyout scheme, purchased patents are normally placed in the public domain so 
that innovations can be produced and marketed at a competitive price, which is 
typically lower than the monopoly price (Kremer, 1998). Patent holders are likely to 
benefit from participating in the buyout mechanism, as they would enjoy a price that 
is typically significantly higher than the private value of the patent. Buyers of 
vaccines or drugs for neglected infectious diseases promoted through an APC would 
typically make the medicines available to patients in least developed countries either 
for free or for a low co-payment (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). Nevertheless, it is 
of crucial importance that the advanced commitment is legally binding and 
enforceable to mitigate the hold-up problem once the innovation is made (Hollis, 
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2007).7 As for patent buyouts, the auction mechanism used to determine the buyout 
price in a buyout scheme must be safeguarded against collusive behaviour between 
auction participants and the patent holder (Kremer, 1998). 
However, there are also some practical differences between APCs and patent 
buyouts. First, APCs only work if the sponsor determines specific details of the 
desired innovation beforehand, whereas the buyout scheme requires no such 
determination (Kremer, 2002). Second, APCs are less vulnerable to problems 
associated with the discovery of harmful side effects after the development and 
regulatory approval of a medicinal product (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). For 
instance, suppose that unacceptable harmful side effects occur subsequent to a patent 
buyout. In this case, Kremer and Glennerster (2004) argue that the patent authority 
may have to engage in a potentially wasteful fight with the innovators to recover the 
buyout money. In contrast to patent buyouts, a sponsor participating in an APC could 
relatively easily suspend the purchase of a drug or vaccine as soon as unacceptable 
harmful side effects are discovered (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). Additionally, 
APCs are likely to generate less public resentment than patent buyouts because the 
purchase payments are successively spread out over a large number of doses 
(Maurer, 2005). For pharmaceutical products such as vaccines that could relatively 
easily be specified in advance by governmental agencies, an APC is likely to be as 
effective as patent buyouts in terms of stimulating research into medicines for 
neglected diseases (Kremer, 2001). APCs are, however, likely to be politically more 
attractive than patent buyouts and less vulnerable to collusive behaviour (Maurer, 
2005). 
From a comparison of the mandatory prize mechanism (applied in the Medical 
Innovation Prize Act) and APCs, Love and Hubbard (2007) conclude that APCs 
                                              
7 See also Layne-Farrar and Schmidt (2010) for a thorough analysis of the hold-up problem in the 
context of complementary patents. 
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require a huge degree of ex ante specification before financial support is provided, 
whereas the prize fund model offers flexibility by linking the reward solely to an ex 
post assessment of health results for the patients. Additionally, the evaluation of 
therapeutic benefits after the development of a therapy stimulated by optional reward 
systems, such as the HIF, may be less difficult than the specification of 
pharmacological characteristics beforehand, as is required in APCs (Kremer and 
Glennerster, 2004). Nevertheless, Hollis and Pogge (2008, p. 7) point out that the 
HIF is a comprehensive approach applying to ‘all kinds of pharmaceutical products 
that improve human health and not just a particular specified vaccine for a neglected 
disease’. By linking rewards to actual health benefits rather than ‘subsidizing sales’, 
the HIF system fosters innovation and improves accessibility in a comprehensive 
way to improve global health. Kremer and Williams (2010) appear to be generally 
open-minded towards the prize mechanisms, but they favour a voluntary mechanism, 
such as the HIF, as opposed to Love and Hubbard’s mandatory approach. By 
implementing a mandatory prize fund mechanism, the pharmaceutical industry’s 
expected return on investment could be reduced, as no adequate alternative incentive 
mechanism to reward R&D would substitute for this mechanism if it failed (Kremer 
and Williams, 2010). Experimenting with voluntary mechanisms would lower this 
risk. It therefore seems advisable to first experiment with voluntary mechanisms in 
order to learn more about the most effective designs and also, arguably, to draw 
conclusions as to the effective designs for mandatory mechanisms. 
IV. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
Empirical evidence suggests that the incentives from patents in the developing world 
are not sufficient to promote research into neglected infectious diseases that is 
adequate to the social and economic costs of those diseases. We have, therefore, 
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analysed several push and pull incentive mechanisms proposed in the literature, with 
respect to the question of whether they mitigate the problem of underinvestment in 
R&D for neglected infectious diseases. 
Push mechanisms, such as research grants and publicly financed research 
institutions, appear to be more suitable than pull mechanisms, such as APCs, to 
promote basic research. Absent any subsidisation of research inputs, private 
incentives to invest in basic research are suboptimal because basic innovations may 
neither be patentable nor commercially exploitable. The results of basic research are 
typically not specifiable in advance so that basic research usually cannot be 
stimulated through an APC (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004). Nevertheless, basic 
research discoveries provide the basis for subsequent applied research that is 
patentable and commercially exploitable (Maurer, 2005). Push mechanisms are, 
however, vulnerable to moral hazard and adverse selection problems, due to 
information asymmetries between researchers and research administrators (Webber 
and Kremer, 2001). 
As to prize fund mechanisms, a voluntary mechanism is preferable to the more 
radical mandatory approach. We recommend experimentation with voluntary 
mechanisms that focus on a specific product, eg. X Prizes, which could then be 
improved and applied to a broader range of settings if they succeed. Experimentation 
and trial and error with voluntary mechanisms may also help to refine proposals for 
mandatory programs such as the Medical Innovation Prize Fund. As to patent 
buyouts, the buyout price would typically be at least twice as large as the private 
value of the patent and thus potentially increase R&D incentives (Kremer, 1998). 
Purchased patents would typically be placed in the public domain so that an 
innovation could be produced and marketed at a competitive price. This would 
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mitigate the problem of access to affordable medicines when manufacturers of 
pharmaceuticals charge monopoly prices. 
Legally binding and enforceable APCs are also likely to promote pharmaceutical 
research into neglected infectious diseases through a transparent, market-oriented 
approach (Kremer, 2002). Sponsors involved in an APC would typically provide 
consumers in low-income countries with medicines at zero cost or for modest co-
payment. However, APCs appear to be more appropriate than patent buyouts, as they 
are likely to be at least as effective as patent buyouts in terms of stimulating research 
but more politically appealing and less vulnerable to collusive behaviour (Kremer 
and Glennerster, 2004). 
In conclusion, a combination of push and pull programs appears to be an 
appropriate strategy for stimulating research into neglected infectious diseases. On 
the one hand, early-stage (basic) research should be supported through push 
mechanisms, eg. research grants or publicly financed research institutions. On the 
other hand, pull mechanisms, such as legally binding and enforceable purchase 
commitments or prize fund mechanisms, have the potential to stimulate research into 
neglected infectious diseases and help solve the problem that consumers in low-
income countries lack affordable access to essential medicines. 
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